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About this Series 
The Royal Irish Academy-British Academy Brexit 
Briefings is a series aimed at highlighting and 
considering key issues related to the UK’s withdrawal 
from the EU within the context of UK-Ireland 
relations. This series is intended to raise awareness of 
the topics and questions that need consideration and/
or responses as the UK negotiates its exit from EU.
The Royal Irish Academy/Acadamh Ríoga 
na hÉireann (RIA) 
Ireland’s leading body of experts in the sciences, 
humanities and social sciences. Operating as an 
independent, all-island body, the RIA champions 
excellence in research, and teaching and learning, 
north and south. The RIA supports scholarship 
and promotes an awareness of how science and 
the humanities enrich our lives and benefit society. 
Membership of the RIA is by election and considered 
the highest academic honour in Ireland. 
The British Academy 
The UK’s independent national academy representing 
the humanities and social sciences. For over a century 
it has supported and celebrated the best in UK 
and international research and helped connect the 
expertise of those working in these disciplines with 
the wider public. The Academy supports innovative 
research and outstanding people, influences policy 
and seeks to raise the level of public understanding 
of some of the biggest issues of our time, through 
policy reports, publications and public events. The 
Academy represents the UK’s research excellence 
worldwide in a fast-changing global environment. It 
promotes UK research in international arenas, fosters 
a global approach across UK research, and provides 
leadership in developing global links and expertise. 
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Rights and the Good Friday 
Agreement
The Good Friday Agreement (‘the GFA’) is both 
a peace agreement, and the basis for reformed 
government in Northern Ireland. It has three 
dimensions: an internal Northern Ireland dimension, 
providing for a Northern Ireland government based 
on power-sharing between nationalists and unionists; 
a North-South dimension, establishing mechanisms 
for greater co-operation between Ireland and 
Northern Ireland; and an East-West dimension, with 
mechanisms facilitating relations between Ireland and 
the various parts of the United Kingdom. Addressing 
the three sets of relationships was the basis for the 
peace process, and rights were one of the central 
instruments for achieving this. 
The GFA was much more than a rights-driven 
document, but rights are central to each dimension. 
The sources of these rights are diverse, with 
devolved, national, international and supranational 
elements layered on top of each other. One set of 
rights recognises the dual-national makeup of the 
Northern Ireland population: a majority considering 
themselves British, a minority considering themselves 
Irish, and some considering themselves to be both. 
Another set of rights seeks to ensure respect for a 
broader set of human rights for all, including equality 
and non-discrimination rights, transcending the issue 
of differing national allegiances. Both are essential 
building blocks for the future Northern Ireland that 
the GFA envisaged. 
The Agreement provides that the people of Northern 
Ireland may choose to have Irish citizenship or British 
citizenship, or both. Those born in Northern Ireland 
(and their spouses and children) are thus entitled 
(in the case of spouses after a period of residence) 
to both UK and Irish passports, although in practice 
many have only Irish, or only UK, passports. The 
internal Northern Ireland dimension provides for 
strengthened anti-discrimination and equality 
legislation to be introduced. It also provides that 
the governance arrangements in Northern Ireland 
will include human rights protections based on the 
European Convention on Human Rights (‘the ECHR’). 
A Human Rights Commission is established, with the 
role (among others) of developing proposals for a 
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights to supplement the 
ECHR. The North-South dimension provides that 
human rights protected in Ireland (including socio-
economic rights, such as labour and employment 
rights) will be equivalent to those in Northern Ireland, 
that Ireland would incorporate the ECHR into Irish 
law, that there would be a joint committee of the 
Northern Ireland and Irish human rights commissions, 
and that an all-Ireland Charter of Rights would be 
produced. 
The linkage between the protection of rights and 
the GFA is important in another respect. Rights 
established before the GFA was concluded often 
underpin aspects of that Agreement, which in turn 
often significantly contributes to their smooth 
operation in practice. The North-South and East-
West dimensions were preceded by the common 
travel area arrangements (CTA), which provide for 
free movement rights on the island of Ireland, and 
between the island of Ireland and Great Britain. These 
rights are more extensive than those that derive from 
the principle of freedom of movement in EU law, the 
CTA itself is currently not legally enforceable under 
either UK or Irish law. 
Over time, and largely arising out of the CTA 
arrangements, reciprocal rights for UK and Irish 
nationals (some of which are legally enforceable) now 
include the right to enter and reside in the UK and 
Ireland, the right to work, the right to study, access to 
social welfare entitlements and benefits and access 
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to health services, and the right to vote in local and 
parliamentary elections. Some equality rights also 
significantly predated the GFA. In both cases, these 
rights provided some of the key policies that the GFA 
built on. Recognising this, the GFA, in turn, directly 
provides for these rights to be further strengthened 
(in the case of equality), or indirectly builds on and 
assumes the existence of these rights (in the case 
of the CTA), without therefore having to specifically 
address them. 
When it was concluded, the GFA clearly presupposed 
that both Ireland and the United Kingdom would 
both be members of the European Union -- no one 
even contemplated the idea that one of them might 
leave the EU, a view endorsed by the UK Supreme 
Court in Miller. This significantly affected the way 
in which rights in the GFA were dealt with. This, in 
turn, affected the framework of the Northern Ireland 
Act 1998 and, indirectly, the wider UK devolution 
settlement. Whilst the EU was never conceived as the 
sole guarantor of rights in Northern Ireland, rights 
deriving from the EU are, nevertheless, an important 
dimension of the post-GFA architecture. 
In particular, rights deriving from the EU provided 
one element of the common understanding of 
rights shared between the UK and Ireland (the other 
important dimension being the ECHR). In addition, 
there is a wide range of rights afforded to people in 
Northern Ireland directly under EU law. These include 
the European Single Market’s four freedoms (free 
movement of goods, capital, services, and people), 
and rights such as EU equality law, that together 
with domestic anti-discrimination law, partially meet 
obligations under the GFA. The common travel area 
arrangement between the UK government and the 
Irish government operates in tandem with the free 
movement provisions of EU law, to such a degree that 
it is often difficult to disaggregate what is the precise 
source of the particular free movement right in issue. 
The fact of both the UK and Ireland being in the 
EU also underpins and significantly delivers on the 
GFA requirement that rights in Northern Ireland 
will mirror those in Ireland, and vice versa. Ireland 
and Northern Ireland are both bound by the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, for example, 
when government implements EU law. Ireland and 
Northern Ireland are both subject to the fundamental 
rights jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (‘the CJEU’), part of EU law’s 
general principles. General principles are applied by 
the CJEU and domestic courts, for example, as an 
aid to interpretation of EU law; examples of general 
principles include fundamental rights, including 
equality. Ireland and Northern Ireland have similar 
employment rights where these are derived from EU 
law, such as the provisions regarding working time. 
Ireland and Northern Ireland accord a similar status 
to EU-derived rights. 
More broadly still, these rights are common EU-wide 
rights, and therefore affording a degree of distance 
above and beyond the local and national spheres 
in both the formulation of these rights and their 
enforcement. In practical terms, the principle of the 
supremacy of EU law, together with requirements 
regarding the direct effect of EU law at the national 
level, mean that domestic courts in both Ireland 
and the UK must disapply primary legislation, or a 
rule of the common law, or strike down secondary 
legislation, if the domestic law is in breach of EU law. 
Given the nature of the community divisions which 
the GFA seeks to address, this is a significant feature. 
As importantly, the EU dimension provides a right 
to supervision and ultimate enforcement of the 
rights at the supra-national level. In particular, access 
to the Court of Justice of the European Union, by 
way of references to the Court by national courts, 
enable individuals to vindicate EU-derived rights 
and to secure a wide range of remedies. EU law thus 
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establishes effective mechanisms for making rights-
violators accountable in ways that complement 
and supplement judicial remedies under the ECHR 
and the domestic law of Northern Ireland. So, for 
example, EU law now provides for damages against 
the UK government for failure to implement EU 
directives (termed Francovich damages) that act as a 
powerful incentive to comply. Such damages are not 
otherwise available under existing UK law. 
In short, several of the rights and entitlements that 
are provided for directly or indirectly in the GFA are 
themselves either directly or indirectly underpinned 
by EU law, and its system of effective remedies. 
But the political effect of common membership in 
the EU goes beyond even that, underpinning the 
requirement that the UK provide for the ECHR to be 
implemented in Northern Ireland, by virtue of the 
political requirement that Member States of the EU 
should be parties to the ECHR. 
Problems for rights in 
Northern Ireland posed by 
Brexit 
The United Kingdom’s exit from the EU will thus 
affect the extent and delivery of a wide array of rights 
in Northern Ireland unless effective steps are taken 
to ameliorate its effects. The following range of rights 
will all potentially be affected: EU-underpinned rights, 
particularly those specifically mentioned in the GFA 
(such as equality rights); fundamental rights deriving 
directly from EU membership, including those in 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; labour and 
employment rights deriving from EU law; and the 
right to an effective judicial remedy. 
Given its history, adversely affecting these rights 
could have significant consequences that are specific 
to Northern Ireland and more severe than will be the 
case in any other part of the UK. Northern Ireland is 
the only part of the UK which, after Brexit, will share 
a land border with the EU, and thus free movement 
rights are of particular importance. Any undermining 
of the operation of the CTA challenges a principal 
objective of the GFA, that the importance of the 
land border should be minimised. Equality law is of 
considerable constitutional importance in Northern 
Ireland, given the extent of discrimination that 
dogged its history. Indeed, human rights protections 
generally have a particular salience in the politics 
of Northern Ireland, given the history of terrorism 
and state responses to it. Such measures offered 
reassurance that Northern Ireland was embarking on 
a programme of real change. 
Leaving the EU would also impact on the remedies 
available for the enforcement of rights in Northern 
Ireland, in particular the extent to which human 
rights obligations limit Parliamentary sovereignty, 
an important part of the political settlement. In this 
respect, the remedies available under EU law for a 
breach of equality law, for example, are potentially 
more far-reaching than the remedies available under 
the Human Rights Act 1998, the Northern Ireland Act 
1998, and domestic anti-discrimination law. This is 
because EU-based remedies include the power for 
courts to disapply UK law that is contrary to EU law, 
and to award Francovich damages to an individual 
who suffers loss as a result of the government’s 
breach of EU law. These represent forms of remedy 
that could be employed by a Northern Ireland court 
currently – including in the context of EU human 
rights and equality provisions. Because of the 
supremacy of EU law, national law is thus prevented 
from reducing rights protections below EU standards, 
at the same time ensuring common North-South 
equality protections as required by the GFA. Unless 
specific measures are taken to provide otherwise, 
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exiting the European Union will mean remedies such 
as this, enforceable domestically and supra-nationally, 
will be irrevocably lost. Individuals would, for example, 
have a right to compensation, if at all, only under UK 
law, and that right could be reduced or limited or 
removed by UK legislation. 
Whether these consequences are good or bad is 
ultimately a matter of subjective political judgement. 
Some may consider that problems were created in 
trying to insert what is sometimes seen as a more 
rigid, EU culture of rights into the UK, and that 
removing this would be for the best. Differences 
between the UK and the EU over the best approach 
to take have long been a source of tension, and 
it would be misguided to suppose that the EU’s 
approach was always necessarily to be preferred, 
simply because it derived from the EU. Traditional 
UK approaches to the protection of rights, through 
common law and Parliamentary legislation should not 
always be assumed to result in less good protection 
of rights. 
Nor, of course, should we assume that a rights-
based approach, whether derived for the EU or not, 
is always the best way of tacking political problems. 
Sometimes, they may damage relationships, when 
for example claiming rights results in a principled 
stand-off rather than political negotiation. And it 
is a political judgment whether the use of rights to 
underpin a social-market economic system, by way 
of socio-economic rights such as labour rights, is 
preferable to de-regulated, neo-liberalism. 
That said, others will consider that relying exclusively 
on politics rather than legal rights, and on traditional 
British approaches to such rights, both contributed 
to the unfortunate state of affairs in Northern Ireland 
that the GFA’s rights-oriented approach, and the 
Agreement’s assumption of the continuing role of 
EU-underpinned rights, were designed to change. 
The failure of the UK Supreme Court to develop 
robust common law constitutional protections for 
rights arising from the GFA in the Miller case, which 
involved a challenge to the triggering of Article 
50, further undermined the assertion that such an 
approach would easily replace EU-derived rights in 
Northern Ireland. 
Supporters of EU-derived rights would also suggest, 
no doubt, that the relative success of a social-market 
economy during the 1990s was one of the conditions 
which allowed the GFA to come into being, and with 
it a period of uneasy, but nevertheless significant, 
peace. The important political point is not that there 
is disagreement about the importance of rights in 
Northern Ireland – that is obvious – but that this 
disagreement is a difference that divides the two 
communities, and reigniting the debate over rights 
has thus a significant destabilising effect. 
Turning from the politics and economics of rights to 
the difficulties arising from Brexit for the modalities 
of rights protections, there is a significant additional 
uncertainty, arising from the structure of the 
devolution arrangements currently in place, that will 
affect the status of rights protections in Northern 
Ireland after Brexit in two respects. 
First, the powers available to the Northern Ireland 
Assembly and Executive are currently limited by 
the EU law compliance provisions of the Northern 
Ireland Act 1998. The Assembly is not capable of 
legislating, and Northern Ireland departments are not 
competent to act, in breach of EU law. The exercise 
of devolved powers that overlap with EU law must 
therefore not only comply with the substantive 
provisions of EU law, but also the fundamental 
rights law that in turn conditions these substantive 
provisions. This imposes a significant constraint; 
Ministers may not discriminate against men who have 
sex with other men in establishing the criteria for 
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blood donations, to take a recent example. Getting 
rid of this constraint would thus significantly increase 
the powers of the Assembly and Executive; it would 
place issues that remain contentious between the 
communities, and that are currently beyond their 
powers, now potentially within their powers. 
Second, at the moment, powers have been devolved 
to the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive that 
enable those bodies to legislate and implement rights 
that, in part, derive from EU law. Equality law is the 
most prominent example. After Brexit, existing areas 
of EU competence will be repatriated to the UK, 
but there is considerable uncertainty as to which of 
these competences will be allocated to Westminster/
Whitehall, and which to the devolved governments 
across the UK. There is thus the potential for Brexit 
to lead to a significant decrease in the powers 
of the Assembly and Executive, such as the EU 
competencies which engage equality and human 
rights. 
Brexit has the potential, therefore, to reshape 
devolved government, by both increasing the 
powers of devolved institutions in some respects, 
and decreasing their powers in others, in both 
cases adding to the political difficulties of forming 
and maintaining devolved government in Northern 
Ireland. 
A further difficulty for rights protections in Northern 
Ireland from Brexit is that the existing EU-regulated 
single market system, one relatively sympathetic to 
aspects of labour rights, for example, will need to be 
replaced with something different and, potentially, 
much less sympathetic to these requirements, 
which is a significant difficulty for supporters of the 
existing social-market economy. The UK’s stated 
aims, post-Brexit, include reaching extensive trade 
and investment agreements with states other than 
the EU, such as the United States. The question that 
will arise in this context is what deregulation other 
states with which the UK wishes to conclude an 
agreement require, in order to conclude the deal. 
In such agreements, the principal issue is often not 
the question of tariff barriers, but non-tariff barriers, 
which may be seen by the other state to include 
regulatory standards in the UK that the other state 
considers a barrier to entry into the UK market. 
Examples would include regulatory standards such 
as restricting hormones in beef, but it could equally 
include some types of rights protections, particularly 
in the area of labour rights and equality. 
The potential impact on human rights in Northern 
Ireland of leaving the customs union and introducing 
new immigration controls, as is currently envisaged 
by the UK Government, are also significant. Leaving 
the customs union will require customs controls of 
some kind, which will require some policing. So too, 
current discussions on future UK immigration policy 
suggests an imminent immigration clampdown. Taken 
together, it would be reasonable to suppose that 
there will be a need for enhanced police powers, 
and increasing police activity on and around the 
border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. To 
the extent that this involves policing by bodies other 
than the Police Service of Northern Ireland, such as 
the UK Border Force, such bodies may be outside 
the police accountability mechanisms established 
in Northern Ireland since 2001. A return to much 
more contentious policing would potentially have 
significant negative effect in Northern Ireland on 
public confidence in the rule of law. 
Finally, a significant layer of rights protection in 
Northern Ireland now derives from the Human 
Rights Act 1998 and the ECHR. Proposals to replace 
the Human Rights Act 1998 with a UK Bill of Rights, 
and the possible withdrawal of the UK from the 
ECHR, although temporarily stayed, have not gone 
away. During the recent UK General Election, the 
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Conservative Party committed a future Conservative 
Government not to leave the ECHR or replace the 
Human Rights Act during the term of this Parliament, 
but that commitment is time-limited. Brexit will 
remove the significant political requirement that 
the UK continue as member of the ECHR, and 
effectively implement the ECHR in practice, as part 
of its responsibilities as an EU member state. Since 
the ECHR would, in the absence of anything more 
robust, be the primary external constraint on new 
post-Brexit UK-Ireland arrangements in areas such 
as immigration, customs, intelligence-gathering, and 
data-protection, weakening the status of the ECHR is 
of considerable significance. 
Rights in the negotiations: 
the EU-27’s position 
Once the withdrawal process was formally underway, 
with the transmittal of the Prime Minister’s letter 
triggering Article 50 in March 2017, the European 
Council set out its negotiating guidelines, which 
indicated that the Irish Government had persuaded 
the EU to seek to guarantee the Good Friday 
Agreement in the negotiations. The Guidelines 
referred, in particular, to the “unique circumstances 
on the island of Ireland,” which required “flexible 
and imaginative solutions,” including in order to 
avoid “a hard border, while respecting the integrity 
of the Union legal order.” In this context, “the Union 
should also recognise existing bilateral agreements 
and arrangements between the United Kingdom and 
Ireland which are compatible with EU law”. These 
“agreements and arrangements” include both the 
CTA arrangements and the GFA, “in all its parts”. 
The European Commission negotiating directives 
elaborated on these guidelines, drawing attention 
to two issues of particular significance in the Irish 
context: First, “[f]ull account,” said the paper, 
“should be taken of the fact that Irish citizens 
residing in Northern Ireland will continue to enjoy 
rights as EU citizens.” In addition, “[e]xisting bilateral 
agreements and arrangements between Ireland and 
the United Kingdom, such as the Common Travel 
Area, which are in conformity with EU law, should be 
recognised.” An Irish Government priorities paper 
on the Article 50 issues that are unique to Ireland, 
drew attention to a third rights issue, in addition 
to the CTA and EU citizens’ rights in Northern 
Ireland, namely the right of the people of Northern 
Ireland to choose either UK or Irish citizenship: “The 
[Irish] Government”, it stated, “will also ensure the 
protection of the rights of those in Northern Ireland 
who choose to exercise their right to hold Irish, and 
thus EU, citizenship, and will advocate for continued 
EU engagement in Northern Ireland.” 
Not only have the rights identified as related to 
the issue of Ireland/Northern Ireland become 
increasingly specific, but their importance in the 
negotiations as a whole has been significantly 
enhanced. The EU-27 has made it clear that it 
considers that there are two separable phases in 
the negotiations with the UK concerning Brexit. 
The first set of negotiations concern the exit 
arrangements, and the EU-27 has identified three 
key issues on which “sufficient progress” needs to 
be made, before the second phase (of conducting 
negotiations on the future relationship between 
the EU and the UK, including trading relationships) 
can take place. These three key issues are: (i) the 
financial settlement concerning existing and future 
UK commitments; (ii) the position of EU citizens 
in the UK, and vice versa; and (iii) addressing the 
problems that arise for the ROI and NI from Brexit, 
including the threat to the Good Friday Agreement. 
The second and third of these engage areas of rights 
protections of particular relevance for Ireland/
Northern Ireland. 
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The EU-27’s paper on “Guiding Principles for the 
dialogue on Ireland/Northern Ireland,” published 
in September marked a considerable deepening 
of the EU-27’s commitments to protect rights in 
Northern Ireland. As regards citizenship, the paper 
stated that: “Full account should be taken of the fact 
that Irish citizens residing in Northern Ireland will 
continue to enjoy rights as EU citizens. To this end, 
the Withdrawal Agreement should respect and be 
without prejudice to the rights, opportunities and 
identity that come with European Union citizenship 
for the people of Northern Ireland who choose to 
assert their right to Irish citizenship.” 
The CTA was recognised as “fundamental to 
facilitating the interaction of people in Ireland and 
the United Kingdom” and “underpin[ing] the peace 
process and the provisions of the Good Friday 
Agreement, in particular the citizenship and identity 
provisions…”. The paper identified what it considered 
the United Kingdom’s “readiness to ensure that 
the Common Travel Area can continue to operate 
without compromising Ireland’s ability to honour 
its obligations as a European Union Member State, 
including in relation to free movement for European 
Economic Area nationals to and from Ireland.” 
In addition, however, the EU-27 went significantly 
beyond the protection of EU and Irish citizenship 
rights and free movement, including specific mention 
for the first time of the broader set of rights 
protections associated with the GFA. Regarding 
these, the paper stated: “The Good Friday Agreement 
includes provisions on Rights, Safeguards and Equality 
of Opportunity, for which European Union law and 
practice has provided a supporting framework in 
Northern Ireland and across the island.” It continued: 
“The Good Friday Agreement requires equivalent 
standards of protection of rights in Ireland and 
Northern Ireland.” 
As a result, the aim of the negotiations from the 
perspective of the EU-27 is now that the United 
Kingdom “should ensure that no diminution of 
rights [in Northern Ireland] is caused by the United 
Kingdom’s departure from the European Union, 
including in the area of protection against forms of 
discrimination currently enshrined in Union law” 
(emphasis added). The EU-27’s negotiating position 
on Ireland does not distinguish between what is 
necessary for the long term on Ireland, and what may 
be necessary in any implementation/transition period. 
In other words, what is described above relates to 
the final agreement. (So far, there is no indication 
that the EU-27 will require equivalent non-regression 
in the rest of the United Kingdom, and in that 
context, one could imagine significant differences 
on what the EU would require on rights between any 
transition period and the final agreement.) This is a 
powerful statement of intent on the part of the EU 
27, committing the EU 27 to engaging with the UK 
to ensure that it will provide for the non-regression 
of a significant part of the existing acquis of rights 
protection in Northern Ireland. There is, however, a 
very significant gap between the EU-27 and the UK on 
this, particularly concerning the protection of general 
equality and human rights protections other than 
those concerned with citizenship. 
Rights in the negotiations: 
the UK’s position 
The approach adopted by the UK Government to 
rights issues in Northern Ireland is, thus far, less clear 
and less extensive. There is broad agreement on 
some of the general principles: to avoid a return to a 
hard border; to maintain the CTA; to make sure that 
nothing is done to jeopardise the peace process in 
Northern Ireland; and to continue to uphold the GFA. 
Beyond informally agreeing these broad principles, 
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however, there is relatively little agreement, thus far, 
on any details on how these commitments can be 
made operational in a way that is consistent with EU 
law, and able to be delivered politically at Westminster. 
As a result, there is relatively little detail in the UK’s 
position paper about rights issues in Northern Ireland, 
with the exception of citizenship and CTA rights. “At 
this stage,” says the UK’s position paper on Ireland/
Northern Ireland, the UK proposes only that both the 
UK and the EU “formally recognise that the citizenship 
rights set out in the Good Friday Agreement will 
continue to be upheld” (emphasis added). These 
appear to include the right of the people of Northern 
Ireland to identify themselves and be accepted 
as British or Irish or both; to equal treatment 
irrespective of their choice; and to hold both British 
and Irish citizenship. As regards the operation of the 
CTA, the UK has proposed that “the UK and the EU 
seek to agree text for the Withdrawal Agreement 
that recognises the ongoing status of the CTA and 
associated reciprocal arrangements following the UK’s 
exit from the EU.” 
Even with regard to these EU citizens’ rights and 
the CTA, the modalities are seldom explored, in 
particular regarding the rights of EEA citizens other 
than Irish nationals, and the problem of how to 
make these commitments consistent with Ireland’s 
obligations under EU law. The UK’s position is that 
“the UK’s future operation of its whole border and 
immigration controls for EEA nationals (other than 
Irish nationals) can only be addressed as part of the 
future relationship between the UK and the EU.” This 
has been regarded by some as attempting to locate 
the Irish Border issue in the UK’s new economic 
relations with the EU, thus attempting to break the 
EU-27’s determination that issues surrounding Ireland/
Northern Ireland should be substantially addressed 
before moving on to post-Brexit trade and customs 
arrangements. 
The UK’s position fails to engage with the EU’s 
rights agenda in another respect. Beyond (partially) 
addressing the CTA and citizenship rights issues, 
there is no discussion of any proposed arrangements 
for the continued protection of the other rights 
associated with the GFA immediately following Brexit, 
or whether such rights would be protected in any 
future agreements between the EU and the UK, or 
between the UK and non-EU states. 
Which rights are to be protected, and where, is one 
set of issues, but there is an additional cross-cutting 
consideration: how to make any rights commitments 
that are agreed in any Withdrawal Agreement 
“stick”? The EU-27’s negotiating guidelines are clear 
that the exit agreement “must include effective 
enforcement and dispute settlement mechanisms 
that fully respect the autonomy of the Union and 
of its legal order, including the role of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union …”. This has led to a 
continuing standoff between the UK and the EU over 
the enforcement of citizens’ rights. For the EU-27, it 
would be necessary for any Withdrawal Agreement 
to be capable not only of creating obligations in 
international law but also, in some cases, creating 
individually enforceable and directly effective 
provisions in the domestic courts of EU-27 and the 
UK. The effect would be that individuals could rely 
directly on the relevant provisions of the Withdrawal 
Treaty in front of UK domestic courts to override 
incompatible domestic legislation. 
Commitments in the Withdrawal Agreement would 
be enforced through rights being granted in UK law, 
presumably in Parliamentary legislation, and would be 
enforceable through the domestic UK judicial system. 
Critically, however, any Withdrawal Agreement-
created rights would not itself have direct effect 
in UK courts. Such courts which would only “have 
regard” to the Withdrawal Agreement “where the 
implementing legislation was ambiguous”, and not 
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otherwise. (This reflects a return to the traditional 
understanding of the relationship between 
international treaties and UK law, an understanding 
that was not adopted in the Human Rights Act.) 
The only barrier to permitting both express and 
implied repeal is the presumption that Parliament 
is presumed to have intended to legislate in 
conformity with the UK’s international obligations – a 
presumption that is rebutted by clear Parliamentary 
language to the contrary. Commitments in any 
Withdrawal Agreement would, as a result, be subject 
to any subsequent, unambiguous Parliamentary 
legislation changing or revoking the domestic 
implementation of the rights protected. 
Rights and the UK’s 
Withdrawal Bill 
Although the UK’s published position papers 
are lacking in detail in some cases, and lack 
engagement with the EU-27’s position in others, the 
UK government negotiating positions need to be 
supplemented by the provisions of the European 
Union (Withdrawal) Bill for a more complete 
understanding of what is intended regarding the 
protection of rights in Northern Ireland after Brexit. 
The Bill was given its formal First Reading in July 
2017, and its Second Reading in September 2017. It is 
currently in Committee, and a potentially lengthy and 
almost certainly extensive process of amendment, 
particularly in the House of Lords, can be 
anticipated. The Bill as published, therefore, should 
not be regarded set in stone, but rather as indicating 
the UK Government’s current intentions only. 
In most respects, the Bill does not distinguish 
between how rights in Northern Ireland and in the 
rest of the United Kingdom will be treated. The 
Withdrawal Bill provides that all EU-derived rights 
in domestic law (or some variation of them) will 
continue in force even after the UK leaves the EU. 
The most significant exceptions to this general 
rule, so far as the practical application of rights is 
concerned, relate to the principle of the supremacy 
of EU law, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and 
the general principles of EU law. 
After Brexit, the supremacy of EU law will no longer 
obtain. Thus, although the current administration 
may commit to retain EU legal standards, future 
administrations will be under no obligation to do so 
and there would be nothing to prevent equality and 
human rights protections currently derived from, or 
supported by, EU law being eroded over time. The 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights will not apply in 
UK law after exit, as there is an explicit provision in 
the Bill preventing this. EU law’s general principles, 
including the EU’s fundamental rights jurisprudence, 
will also generally not apply after Brexit. The 
Bill confusingly refers to the continuing role of 
“fundamental rights”, but it would seem that this is 
a reference to “fundamental rights” in common law, 
not in EU law. 
The Bill enables the UK to comply with its 
international obligations by giving a power to 
Ministers to make regulations that remedy any 
breaches of international obligations arising from 
withdrawal from the EU. Secondary legislation made 
under the power in this clause can do anything an 
Act of Parliament might. This is subject to limitations, 
such as not being able to amend the Human Rights 
Act, but it does allow amendment of the Northern 
Ireland Act 1998, as does the power to implement 
the contents of any withdrawal agreement. 
Regulations may make any provision that could be 
made by an Act of Parliament (including modifying 
the contents of the Bill itself when it is enacted). But 
regulations may not amend, repeal or revoke the 
Human Rights Act 1998. 
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In one significant respect, however, Northern Ireland 
is distinguished, together with Wales and Scotland. 
We have seen that institutions in Northern Ireland 
have had devolved to them broad powers over areas 
of rights. As currently envisaged in the Withdrawal 
Bill, the UK government intends that with regard to 
those devolved policy fields that are not currently 
subject to the EU acquis, devolved institutions 
will continue to be able to legislate, subject to the 
broad constraints set out in the NIA 1998 and other 
legislation. So, for example, the issue of same-sex 
marriage equality, which is not currently part of the 
EU acquis, would remain a matter for the Assembly 
after exit, to the same extent as it is before exit. 
However, the UK government’s proposal regarding 
EU-derived rights is that powers over these areas 
would be returned to the UK Parliament, even 
in those areas where the implementation of EU 
policy at the domestic level is currently devolved. 
The Bill provides that the devolved legislatures or 
administrations may only modify retained EU law 
to the extent that they had the competence to do 
so immediately before exit. The effect of this is that 
what was a common European approach will now 
become a common United Kingdom approach on 
exiting from the EU. 
According to the Explanatory Memorandum, the 
UK Government “hopes to rapidly identify, working 
closely with devolved administrations, areas that 
do not need a common framework and which 
could therefore be released from the transitional 
arrangement by this power. This process will be led 
by the First Secretary of State and supported by 
the relevant territorial Secretary of State and will 
begin immediately following the Bill’s introduction.” 
The approach adopted, it is said, “allows for the 
UK Government to hold discussions with the 
devolved administrations to establish areas where 
a common approach is or is not required, to help 
determine where UK frameworks might need to 
be kept after exit.” Given that there is currently no 
Northern Ireland Executive in existence, however, 
it is particularly unclear what, if any, mechanism is 
available for these negotiations. 
Even if the Northern Ireland Executive is re-
formed, however, the UK arguably lacks effective 
intra-UK intergovernmental mechanisms capable 
of dealing with these issues. The Joint Ministerial 
Committee, intended to bring together the leaders 
of the devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland with the United Kingdom 
government to consider the implications of Brexit, 
has been marginalised, and the traditional view of 
British constitutionalism apparent in the Supreme 
Court’s judgment in Miller (in particular, the refusal 
to accord any legal status to the constitutional 
conventions protecting devolution arrangements) 
does little to discourage a top-down, command-
and-control attitude from London, rather than 
negotiation. 
In addition, the looming problems arising for the 
protection of rights in Northern Ireland have 
received scarcely any attention in the UK-wide 
debate on Brexit, which is hardly surprising given the 
extraordinarily low profile of Irish issues generally 
in Brexit debates before and since the referendum. 
Describing Ireland/Northern Ireland as a mere side-
show in British politics would be seen by many on 
the island of Ireland to be overly generous. And these 
issues are themselves overshadowed by the fact that 
the current UK government is dependent on the 
Democratic Unionist Party (which overwhelmingly 
derives its support from one section of the 
community in Northern Ireland) for its Parliamentary 
majority. If a comprehensive form of direct rule from 
London were to be introduced, over the objections 
of the Irish Government, any negotiations would 
be even more controversial, since Northern Ireland 
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interests would be represented by UK ministers – 
involving, arguably, a conflict of interests. 
In the currently unlikely event that serious 
negotiations on the protection of rights in Northern 
Ireland post-Brexit were to be undertaken on a UK 
intergovernmental level, it is very uncertain what 
could be contemplated. In that context, one of the 
Northern Ireland issues left unresolved in the Miller 
case – the scope of obligations arising under section 
75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 – could reappear, 
in the form of a request to subject proposals 
emerging from negotiations to an equality impact 
assessment. 
Issues that might emerge include: whether any 
common UK policy frameworks should treat 
Northern Ireland as a special case; how the rights 
of Northern-Irish born holders of Irish passports 
will be guaranteed in the future; whether a Bill of 
Rights applying to Northern Ireland could be used 
to guarantee rights that are seen to be under threat 
(does this breathe new life into the Northern Ireland 
Bill of Rights proposed by the Northern Ireland 
Human Rights Commission?); whether there is some 
merit in a further all-island articulation of rights (itself 
contemplated in the GFA, and taken up in the work 
of the joint committee of the Irish and Northern 
Irish Human Rights Commissions); how rights should 
be effectively enforced (should a human rights 
court with judges drawn from both jurisdictions and 
beyond be contemplated, for example?); whether, if 
a common position on rights in Northern Ireland and 
Ireland were to be maintained, this could mean that 
there should be some continuing role for the CJEU, if 
only in ensuring that the rights of Northern Ireland-
born citizens of Ireland (and thus EU citizens) are 
protected. 
That these issues will need to be considered 
somewhere is clear, but at the moment it seems more 
likely that they will arise in the Brussels negotiations 
themselves rather than be resolved at the UK 
intergovernmental level. 
These speculations aside, the further question arises 
whether such discussions (whether conducted 
in London or Brussels) would in any event be 
significantly limited by existing UK policy positions. 
Would the UK government regard the current EU 
policy framework on areas of human rights and 
equality, for example, as an area requiring a common 
UK policy framework, or would it be prepared to 
allow Northern Ireland to adopt a different policy 
framework in those areas currently the subject 
of a common EU policy framework? The White 
Paper identifies two criteria that indicate that UK 
government might be loath to allow important 
aspects of the rights framework in Northern Ireland 
to be devolved to Northern Ireland institutions, 
namely the importance of being able to secure trade 
deals with third countries, and the need to protect 
the “single market” in the UK. 
As we have seen, compliance with future international 
trade obligations may arise in this context because 
equality requirements may come to be seen as 
giving rise to non-tariff barriers to trade in goods 
and services, or as a barrier to investment. So too, 
the argument may well be made that a common UK 
equality framework is necessary in order to lessen 
the likelihood that, for example, different equality 
frameworks in the England, Wales, Scotland, and 
Northern Ireland could give rise to an “adverse effect 
on the operation of the single market” within the 
United Kingdom. Intriguing though both of these 
arguments are, further consideration is hampered 
by the current absence of any real discussion of the 
fuller implications of either. 
Unless and until the allocation of power to the 
centre is altered by Parliament, devolved institutions 
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in Northern Ireland would no longer be able to 
legislate, for example, in those areas of equality that 
were previously subject to a common EU equality 
framework. They would be required to retain the 
current EU approach to equality, which would now 
become the UK approach, until it was altered by 
Westminster. Essentially, the substantive status quo 
would be preserved at the UK level, subject to the 
UK Parliament deciding to alter it, and there would 
be no power at the devolved level to change this, 
thus significantly altering the shape of devolved 
government. That has various consequences, 
not least in preventing the devolved institutions 
from continuing to keep in step with common EU 
standards, even if they wanted to do so, despite the 
expectation in the GFA that the presence of EU law 
would be a continuing influence. 
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